University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series

Economics

2022

Growth cycles in mature and dual economies
Peter Skott
University of Massachusetts - Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Income Distribution Commons, and the Macroeconomics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Skott, Peter, "Growth cycles in mature and dual economies" (2022). Economics Department Working
Paper Series. 325.
https://doi.org/10.7275/d9va-kv81

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

Growth cycles in mature and dual economies
Peter Skott
March 11, 2022

Abstract
Mature economies may experience ‡uctuations, but the average medium
and long run growth rate matches the natural rate. Like Kaldor’s neoKeynesian models, the Marx-Goodwin tradition explains this outcome
by endogenizing the distribution of income and assuming that the accumulation of capital is increasing as a function of the pro…t share. The
application of Goodwin cycles to developing economies may be hard to
justify, however. The modi…ed Goodwin models in this paper include
relative-wage norms as a central element of wage formation. Norms change
endogenously, leading to path dependence (hysteresis) in the stationary
solution for the employment share of the modern sector. The e¤ects of
shocks –the sensitivity of the long-run outcome to initial conditions –may
be ampli…ed by non-linearities in the adjustment of wages to deviations
of actual wages from the norm.
Key words: Goodwin cycles, wage norms, employment hysteresis
JEL codes: E11, E32, O41
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Introduction

Harrod’s analysis of the dynamics of capitalist economies identi…ed two distinct
problems. The …rst problem concerned the absence of automatic adjustments of
the ‘warranted rate of growth’to the ‘natural rate’. Assuming a constant saving
rate out of income, a constant output capital ratio and a constant depreciation
rate of capital, the equilibrium condition for the goods market determines a
unique warranted rate of growth; only by a ‡uke will this warranted rate be
equal to the growth rate of the labor force in e¢ ciency units (the natural rate of
growth). The second problem highlighted the likely instability of the warranted
growth path when …rms react to positive (negative) deviations of actual and
desired utilization by increasing (decreasing) the rate of accumulation.
Many economies follow growth paths that seem to align the natural and warranted growth rates. The rich OECD countries may not always have full employment, but the employment rate ‡uctuates around a fairly high level, and these
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, and Aalborg University;
email: pskott@econs.umass.edu
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economies would come up against labor constraints if aggregate demand were to
expand rapidly over periods lasting more than few years. Large-scale immigration could alleviate labor shortages but would almost certainly run into political
constraints, and it is limited how fast and to what extent these economies would
be able to draw new groups into the domestic labor market through changes in
the retirement age, for instance, or increases in women’s participation rate. In
these ‘mature economies’with ‡uctuations around a near-full-employment trend
the warranted growth rate appears to adjust to the natural rate, with perhaps
some adjustment coming also from induced changes in the natural rate.
I have argued elsewhere that Harrod’s two problems open the way for a Keynesian theory of local instability and endogenous cycles in mature economies.
This paper, however, focuses exclusively on Harrod’s …rst problem and the way
it has been addressed by prominent post-Keynesian and neo-Marxian contributions, especially the literature inspired by Goodwin’s (1967) formalization of
Marx’s general law of capitalist accumulation. Thus, I leave aside Harrodian
instability issues and their role in cyclical ‡uctuations.
Robert Solow’s reconciliation of warranted and natural growth rates relied
on adjustments in the output capital ratio as economies move along a smooth
neoclassical production function. Rejecting this solution, post-Keynesian and
neo-Marxian theories have based the reconciliation on di¤erential saving rates
out of wages and pro…ts and the e¤ects of endogenous changes in income distribution on the average saving rate. The relevance of these models to developing
economies is questionable. One-sector models –whether of the Solow or Goodwin type –may become misleading in economies with small modern sectors and
large reservoirs of underemployment in traditional and informal sectors. The
very process of economic development is characterized by structural transformation, growth rates above the natural rate, and a gradual reduction of underemployment. These features also bring into question the feedback e¤ects from the
labor market to the accumulation rate that are central to the Goodwin cycle.
Section 2 discusses Solow’s solution to Harrod’s …rst problem. Section 3
outlines alternative Kaldorian and Marxian solutions, including the Goodwin
model. Section 4 discusses the application of the Goodwin mechanism to developing economies. Section 5 concludes.

2
2.1

Reconciling warranted and natural growth rates
The Solow solution and neoclassical production functions

If s; ; n; denote the saving rate, the output capital ratio, the growth rate of
the labor force in e¢ ciency units and the depreciation rate, a reconciliation of
warranted and natural growth rates requires that
s =n+
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(1)

The four terms in equation (1) cannot be set independently; at least one of them
must be allowed to adjust to satisfy the equation.
Solow (1956, p. 65) singled out the "crucial assumption that production
takes place under conditions of …xed proportions". Instead of imposing a …xed
output capital ratio, equation (1) can be used to determine the value of the
technical coe¢ cient that is consistent with the equalization of natural and
warranted growth rates. A smooth neoclassical production function ensures the
existence of this growth path, provided the range of possible output capital
ratios is su¢ ciently wide.1
The ubiquitous neoclassical aggregate production function carries a heavy
load in most of contemporary macroeconomics. Yet, the justi…cation for the
production function is extremely weak, both theoretically and empirically. The
issues have been analyzed thoroughly in a voluminous literature and should be
well known. Yet, they seem to be forgotten or simply brushed under the rug;
textbooks simply introduce the production function and the standard assumptions that go with it
The Cambridge capital controversy highlighted the theoretical weaknesses.2
Indeed, Samuelson (1966) conceded the theoretical case in his "summing up",
concluding that
If all this causes headaches for those nostalgic for the old time parables of neoclassical writing, we must remind ourselves that scholars
are not born to live an easy existence. We must respect, and appraise, the facts of life. (p. 583)
Despite their theoretical weaknesses the ‘old-time parables’go unquestioned in
most contemporary macroeconomics. There appears to be a general perception that the neoclassical production function remains a useful tool, that it has
empirical support, and that it is safe to ignore the theoretical possibilities and
anomalies brought up by the capital controversy.3
1 The existence of the solution is guaranteed if the production function satis…es the Inada
conditions. It may be worth noting that these conditions are restrictive: they fail to be met for
all CES production functions, with the exception of the Cobb-Douglas case. The dynamics
may imply that the capital labor ratio converges to zero if the elasticity of substitution is
below 1; with high substitution elasticities and high saving rates, conversely, the system may
become so productive and save so much that "perpetual full employment will increase the
capital-labor ratio (and also output per head) beyond all limits" (Solow 1956, p. 72). In the
latter case an increase in the saving rate raises the long-run growth rate; the model produces
endogenous growth.
2 See Harcourt (1972), Cohen and Harcourt (2003) and Felipe and Fisher (2003) for surveys of the capital controversy and aggregation in production functions. Some of the key
contributions have been collected in Harcourt and Laing (1971).
3 Solow (1966, pp. 1259-1260) expressed this pragmatic and instrumentalist defense explicitly when he declared that

I have never thought of the macroeconomic production function as a rigorously
justi…able concept. In my mind it is either an illuminating parable, or else a
mere device for handling data, to be used as long as it gives good empirical
results, and to be abandoned as it doesn’t, or as soon as something better comes
along.

3

The empirical case also faces serious problems. Econometric regressions
sometimes seem to …nd support for the neoclassical production function, but
an underlying accounting relation links output to wage and capital income:
Y = wL+rK: This accounting relation implies that a Cobb-Douglas production
function will provide a good …t as long as the shares of wages and pro…ts are
roughly constant, a condition that can be met for reasons that have nothing to
do with perfect markets, Cobb-Douglas production functions and factor prices
that are equal to marginal products; see Fisher (1971) and Shaikh (1974); Felipe
and McCombie 2009 and Felipe and Fisher 2003 provide useful surveys.

2.2

A Kaldor-Solow solution

All long-run macroeconomic models contain some kind of production function
that links current investment to future capacity. But the Cambridge capital
controversy and the literature on aggregation make it preferable to avoid models that rely heavily on the movements along a smooth neoclassical production
function. A Leontief production function represents a simple, neutral starting
point in much the same way that linear functions may be preferred as a benchmark speci…cation if there are no good arguments for introducing non-linearities.
Some other mechanism is needed, however, to reconcile the warranted and natural growth rates if capital intensity does not accommodate smoothly.
Endogenous adjustment of the saving rate is the obvious candidate. DSGE
models and the basic Ramsey model that they build upon typically include a
smooth aggregate production function but do not depend on this assumption:
intertemporal optimization endogenizes the saving rate. Reacting to changes in
the rate of return on capital, the optimizing representative household adjusts
its saving rate, and the economy converges to full-employment growth, even if
there are …xed coe¢ cients in production.
The Ramsey solution is unconvincing, but there are other reasons for a
dependence of the average saving rate on income distribution. This dependence
means that the warranted rate may adjust to the natural rate if endogenous
forces generate appropriate movements in the pro…t share.
Nicholas Kaldor subsequently changed his views, but in the 1950s he regarded steady growth at (near-) full employment as a good approximation to
the experience of most rich economies. He presented his ‘Keynesian’explanation
of this stylized fact in Kaldor (1955-56). Leaving problems of the trade cycle
outside the scope of his paper, he assumed that the natural growth rate governs
the growth rate over longer periods. With a Leontief production function (and
the utilization of capital at the desired rate) the share of pro…ts was, Kaldor
argued, the accommodating variable behind the equalization of the warranted
and natural rates. Formally, if ! denotes the share of wages in income and the
saving propensities out of wages and pro…ts are sw and sp ; the share of wages
(!) must satisfy
[sw ! + sp (1 !)] = n +
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or
! = sp

n+
(sp sw )

Kaldor (1955-56) focused on the steady growth path without any discussion
of …rms’ investment decisions and of how the accumulation rate came to be
adjusted to the natural rate. The argument merely established that it was
possible for the warranted rate to adjust, even if the output capital ratio is
exogenously given. Kaldor was quite clear about this limitation, stating that
his argument "does not mean that there will be an inherent tendency to a
smooth rate of growth in a capitalist economy, only that the causes of cyclical
movements lie elsewhere – not in the lack of an adjustment mechanism (p.
232)" to equalize natural and warranted rates. This important caveat is similar
to Solow’s explicit recognition that his model left out all Keynesian problems.4
For the reasons brought up by the capital controversy Kaldor explicitly rejected smooth neoclassical production functions and marginal productivity theory. But one could embed Kaldor’s argument in a Solow type framework, replete
with marginal productivity theory and dynamic adjustments towards the steady
growth path. Suppose, as in the Solow model, that factor prices are equal to
marginal products; that labor and capital are supplied inelastically; that output
is at the technical maximum (given available factor supplies), and that saving
is automatically invested. With a Leontief production function, the marginal
product of labor and the wage share are zero when labor is in excess supply,
while the gross pro…t rate will be zero when capital is in excess supply. Thus,
the average saving rate will be sw if N < K and sp if N > K. It follows
that
sw N (n + ) it
N< K
^ n=
k^ = K
sp
(n + )
if
N >K
4 His

analysis, Solow explains, represents

the neoclassical side of the coin. Most especially it is full employment economics
–in the dual aspect of equilibrium condition and frictionless, competitive, causal
system. All the di¢ culties and rigidities which go into modern Keynesian income
analysis have been shunted aside. It is not my contention that these problems
don’t exist, nor that they of no signi…cance in the long run. My purpose was to
examine what might be called the tightrope view of economic growth and to see
where more ‡exible assumptions about production would lead a simple model.
(Solow 1956, p. 91)
He goes on to mention some Keynesian obstacles to full employment growth, including rigid
wages and liquidity preference, and ends the paper by commenting on uncertainty (pp. 93-94):
No credible theory of investment can be built on the assumption of perfect
foresight and arbitrage over time. There are only too many reasons why net
investment should be at times insensitive to current changes in the real return
to capital, at other times oversensitive. All these cobwebs and some others
have been brushed aside throughout this essay. In the context, this is perhaps
justi…able.
Unfortunately, the profession has paid little or no attention to these quali…cations.
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So long as sw < n + < sp ; the economy will converge to a steady growth
path with full employment and N = K; k = . The analysis, which can
be extended to cases with a narrow range of feasible output capital ratios, has
a¢ nities with that of Solow. Smooth production function are not required,
however, and the emphasis is on the e¤ects of changes in the distribution of
income on saving and the rate of accumulation.

2.3

A Marx-Goodwin solution

Karl Marx discussed the relation between the warranted and natural growth
rates in chapter 25 of Capital. Fast accumulation reduces the size of the ‘reserve
army of labor’; a small reserve army strengthens workers and wages go up, but
as the pro…t share decreases, accumulation falls, and low accumulation means
that the reserve army is replenished. Or in Marx’s words,
If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class, and
accumulated by the capitalist class, increases so rapidly that its
conversion into capital requires an extraordinary addition of paid
labour, then wages rise, and, all other circumstances remaining equal,
the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But as soon as this
diminution touches the point at which the surplus labour that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction sets
in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalised, accumulation lags, and
the movement of rise in wages receives a check. The rise of wages
therefore is con…ned within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduction
on a progressive scale. (Marx 1867 [1906, p. 680])
The language may seem convoluted and the terminology unfamiliar, but
the basic argument has two elements: movements in the employment rate are
determined by the accumulation of capital, while the employment rate a¤ects
income distribution and the rate of accumulation. These forces, Marx suggests,
interact in a way that secures the reproduction of the capitalist system. Dynamic interactions can be tricky, however, which makes it useful to formalize
the argument.
A version with monotonic convergence Workers saved little, if at all, in
Marx’s time, and the saving rate out of wages is still much lower than that
out of pro…t income. As a stylized version of this observation we may assume
that workers spend what they earn, while capitalists save and invest a constant
proportion (s) of their pro…ts,
I = S = s(1
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!)Y

(2)

Now add a …xed coe¢ cient production function (Y = minfAL; Kg) and assume full utilization of capital and the absence of labor hoarding,
Y
K

=

(3)
1
Y
A

L =

(4)

Dividing through by K in equation (2) and using (3), we have
^ = Y^ = K
^ = s(1
A^ + L

!)

(5)

where ‘hats’over a variable are used to denote growth rates.
Wages, Marx argues, increase when high accumulation generates "an extraordinary addition of paid labor"; that is, when the reserve army of unemployed
declines and workers’ are strengthened in the battle over wages. The employment rate e = L=N can be used as an inverse indicator of the size of the reserve
army of labor, and Marx’s analysis can be interpreted as positing a positive
relation between the employment rate and the real wage per e¢ ciency unit of
labor:
! = f (e); f 0 > 0
(6)
Combining equation (5)-(6), the dynamics of e can be written
^
e^ = L

^ =K
^
N

n = s(1

f (e))

(n + )

(7)

where n = n0 + a is the growth rate of the labor force in e¢ ciency units (a =
^ n0 = N
^ ).
A;
The di¤erential equation (7) has a (non-trivial) stationary solution with
0 < e < 1 if s (1 f (0)) > n > s (1 f (1)): This condition requires that
when workers are very weak (e ! 0), a low wage share ensures accumulation
rates that exceed the natural rate of growth, while strong workers and low
pro…tability as e ! 1 cause accumulation to fall below the natural rate. If
these plausible inequalities are satis…ed, the employment rate converges to the
non-trivial stationary point for any positive initial employment rate,
e!e =f

1

(1

n+
)
s

Endogenous changes in the distribution of income serve to align the warranted
and natural rates. The convergence process is analogous to the Kaldor-Solow
process but with a di¤erence: the Marx version does not have an inelastic supply
of labor, and marginal productivities do not determine factor prices. Instead,
the wage share is determined by wage bargaining, or using a more Marxian
terminology, by the balance of power in the class struggle between capital and
labor.
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2.3.1

A version with cycles

Monotonic convergence to steady growth is not a prediction usually associated
with Karl Marx, and a minor modi…cation of the model produces a very di¤erent
outcome. Equation (6) stipulated a positive relation between the level of the
employment rate and the level of the wage share. It may be more reasonable
– and arguably a more accurate interpretation of Marx’s verbal argument –
to view employment as determining the growth rate of the wage share: strong
workers …ght for and obtain increases in wages.
On this interpretation, equation (6) must be replaced by a dynamic version,
!
^ = f (e)

a;

f 0>0

(8)

where the f (:)-function describes a real-wage Phillips curve. Goodwin (1967)
used this speci…cation in a formalization of Marx’s general law in a model that
has become the workhorse for numerous contributions in (post-) Keynesian
and neo-Marxian macroeconomics. Retaining all other equations and, following
Goodwin, using a linear speci…cation of the f function (f (e) =
+ e), the
model now yields a 2D system in the two state variables, e and !:5
e_ = e[s (1 !) (n + )]
!_ = ![ ( + a) + e]
The system has a unique non-trivial stationary solution with e > 0 and
! > 0;
e

=

!

=

+a
1

n+
s

Evaluated at the stationary point the Jacobian is given by
0

e

J(e; !) =
!

0

The determinant (DetJ = e ! ) is unambiguously positive which rules out
saddlepoints. The trace is zero, and a local analysis of the linearized system
described by the Jacobian matrix leaves the stability properties undetermined.6
5 Goodwin

assumed that all pro…ts are saved (s = 1).
positive (negative) trace is su¢ cient for local instability (local stability) when the
determinant is positive. In a nonlinear system, however, a zero trace may be associated with
local stability, instability or conservative ‡uctuations of constant amplitude. The intuition
behind this indeterminateness when the trace is zero can be illustrated by a 1D system. Let
x_ = g(x) and assume that this di¤erential equation has a stationary point at x0 (g(x0 ) = 0):
The derivative g 0 (x0 ) is the trace of the 1x1 Jacobian matrix for this 1D system, and it is
readily seen that if g 0 (x0 ) = 0; the stationary point can be locally stable (g(x) = (x x0 )3 ,
for example), unstable (g(x) = (x x0 )3 ; for example), or neutrally stable (g(x) = 0; for
example).
6A
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It can be shown, however, that this formalization of Marx’s general law of accumulation yields endogenous growth cycles around the stationary point (e ; ! ):
the system implies closed, counterclockwise loops in (e; !) space, as depicted in
the phase diagram in …gure 1. Starting from an initial position, employment
and the wage share exhibit perpetual ‡uctuations with a constant amplitude;
an exogenous shock that shifts the initial position changes the amplitude of the
‡uctuations as the system moves to a new closed loop. These properties of the
dynamic system extend to formulations with nonlinear real wage Phillips curves
and accumulation functions; see Appendix A for details.
The stationary value of the employment rate is determined by the parameters
of the distributive function (the exogenous elements of relative power) while the
parameters of the accumulation function (including capitalists’saving rate) and
the natural rate of growth determine the wage share. Intuitively, if workers
get stronger and more militant for any given employment rate, an increase in
the reserve army will be needed to restore discipline in the labor market and
prevent an ever-increasing wage share, an adjustment brought about by the
e¤ects of changes in the size of the reserve army of labor. Analogously, changes
in the saving rate, the technical output-capital ratio or the growth rate of the
labor force in e¢ ciency units require adjustments in the wage share in order to
maintain the equality between the rate of accumulation and the natural growth
rates.
In short, a capitalist economy may be unstable – cyclical ‡uctuations are
created endogenously –but homeostatic forces imply that the rise of wages "is
con…ned within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduction on a progressive scale", in Marx’s
words.
Elegant as it is, the Goodwin model fails to capture essential features of the
business cycle. Output is determined by capacity (as in the Solow model), and
with …xed coe¢ cients and unemployment, the capital stock represents the binding constraint. Empirically, by contrast, the utilization rate of capital exhibits
large and systematic ‡uctuations over the cycle.
The source of this failure of the Goodwin model is the absence of Keynesian features. There is no separate investment function, full-capacity saving
automatically gets invested, and no aggregate demand failures constrain output
below full capacity. I have discussed these issues in detail in other work, embedding Marx-Goodwin e¤ects of variations in employment in Keynesian models
with Harrodian instability.7 The purpose of this paper is di¤erent: the MarxGoodwin mechanism – with or without Keynesian complications – may need
signi…cant modi…cation in any application to developing economies.
7 Skott

(1989, 2015, 2022) and Skott and Zipperer (2012). Related work that incorporates
Goodwinian feedback e¤ects from the labor market in a Keynesian setting includes work by
Peter Flaschel and several coauthors (e.g. Chiarella and Flaschel 2000). Barrales et al. (2021)
provide a useful survey of some of the theoretical issues and the evidence.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for the Goodwin model

3
3.1

Goodwin models for dual economies?
A baseline version

O¢ cial unemployment rates are uninformative in dual economies. According
to the ILO, India had unemployment rates below 6 percent from 1991 to 2019,
but huge numbers of underemployed workers in informal sectors with low productivity and low average incomes render this o¢ cial unemployment rate rather
meaningless as an indicator of the state of the Indian labor market.
A simple adaptation of the Goodwin model to developing economies treats
the informal sector as self-contained and uses the share of formal-sector employment as the measure of labor market conditions. If workers’average income
in the informal sector is constant and below the wages in the formal sector,
the modern sector now draws on the reserve army of informal-sector workers in
much the same way that capitalists draw on the reserve army of the unemployed
in Marx’s analysis and the original Goodwin model, while changes in the wage
share of the modern sector may depend on the sector’s employment share.
Formally, let = LM =N denote the employment share of the modern sector
and assume that all workers who fail to …nd a job in the modern sector move
into the informal sector. As in Goodwin’s original formulation, the technology
in the modern sector is Leontief, the accumulation rate is proportional to the
pro…t share, workers spend all income on consumption, and capitalists save and
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invest a proportion of pro…ts. These assumptions imply that
^ = L
^ M n = s (1
!
^ =
( + a) +

!)

(n + )

(9)
(10)

where ! represents the wage share in the modern sector. The interpretation of
the ‘employment rate’and the wage share has changed, but the mathematical
structure and formal properties of this dual-economy model are identical to those
of the original model: the economy exhibits conservative ‡uctuations around a
unique (non-trivial) stationary solution.
Although mathematically sound, this adaptation of the Goodwin model is
economically implausible. Developing economies with small modern sectors and
large reservoirs of underemployment in traditional and informal sectors may
face temporary shortages of skilled workers, but many low-skill workers in the
modern sector earn large wage premiums compared to the average incomes of
similar workers in the informal sector (La Porta and Shleifer 2014). These observations imply that cyclical variations in the employment share of the modern
sector are likely to have little e¤ect on the bargaining power of workers in the
formal sector.
Economic development, second, is associated with structural changes as underemployed workers move from informal to modern sectors, making Harrod’s
…rst problem irrelevant: the very process of economic development is characterized by growth rates above the natural rate and a gradual reduction of underemployment Successful developing economies may experience business cycles, but
they do not ‡uctuate around a constant share of employment in the modern sector: the ‡uctuations take place around a trend of declining underemployment.
Formal and informal sectors, third, are not self-contained. Street vendors
do not sell only to informal sector workers, and casual laborers are hired to do
work for rich households. Workers in the informal sector, likewise, spend some
of their income on TV sets and other goods and services produced in the formal
sector. The sectors interact, and it becomes unreasonable to treat incomes in
the informal sector as independent of the evolution of the formal sector.
Fast growth, fourth, is associated with technological catchup. The pace of
this process of technological change is determined –at least in part –by the rate
of expansion of the modern sector. Verdoorn’s law captures a simple formalization of this process of dynamic increasing returns to scale and semi-endogenous
technical change.8 It may do little harm to leave out induced technical change
of this kind in an examination of cycles in a mature economy; in a dual economy,
by contrast, the medium and long run growth rate of the economy becomes endogenous, potentially making induced technical change signi…cant for the qualitative dynamics. The complications associated with induced technical change
are likely to be less important, however, than those deriving from large informal
sectors, the interaction between formal and informal sectors and the gradual
8 Kaldor (1966) introduced Verdoorn’s law, providing also the …rst empirical estimates of
its magnitude. The law and the empirical assessment of its e¤ects raise several issues; see
Rowthorn (1979), Skott (1999), Ros (2013) and Basu and Budhiraja (2021).
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shift towards the modern sector in the course of successful development. Thus,
to simplify the analysis in the main text I disregard technical change completely
(set the rate of technical change equal to zero); appendix B brie‡y outlines some
implications of induced technical change for the Goodwin model.

3.2

Interactions between the sectors

The informal sectors in most contemporary developing economies do not resemble the self-contained subsistence agriculture in classical models of a dual
economy. Underemployed workers in urban service sectors, who make up a large
proportion of the informal sector, rely on demand from other informal workers
as well as from the formal sector.
The informal sector produces a variety of goods and services, and workers in
the informal sector have to sell these goods and services, e.g. as day laborers,
street vendors, domestic workers or employees in small corner shops and construction activities. The sector may contain small-scale businesses that make a
pro…t but, for simplicity, we may assume that all incomes in the informal sector go to workers and that output is produced using labor as the only input, a
stylized representation of the low capital intensity that characterizes this sector.
Thus, if pU and wU are the price of informal sector output (U goods) and the
average nominal income in the sector (the ‘wage rate’, for short), we have
pU U = wU LU

(11)

where U is the real output and LU = N LM the number of workers in the
informal sector.
As a stylized formalization of the demand structure – and in line with the
assumptions in the Goodwin model –it is assumed that workers in both sectors
spend their income on consumption while capitalists save a fraction s of their
pro…ts, spending the rest on consumption. Thus, aggregate nominal consumption (C) is given by
C = pM CM + pU CU = wU LU + wM LM + (1

s)(pM M

wM LM )

(12)

where CU and CM denote real consumption of goods from the two sectors.
Nominal consumption is split between formal and informal goods, the proportion
of consumption expenditure going to the formal sector. Thus,
pM CM
pU CU

=
C
= (1

)C

(13)
(14)

The informal sector produces a pure consumption good, and the equilibrium
condition requires that
U = CU
(15)
Formal-sector goods can be used for investment or consumption, and the equilibrium condition is given by
M = I + CM
12

(16)

Still following the assumptions of the Goodwin model, capital is fully utilized
and all saved pro…ts are invested, I = s(M wM LM ):
Total informal-sector income can be found by combining the consumption
equations with the equilibrium condition for the informal sector (equations (11)(15)):
1
1
wM LM [s + (1 s) ]
(17)
wU LU = pU U =
!
Thus, the average income in the informal sector and the ‘wage ratio’ wU =wM
are given by
wU

=

wU
wM

=

1

wM LM
[s + (1
N LM

1
1

[s + (1

1
1
s) ] =
!
1
1
s) ] = ( ; !);
!

[s + (1
> 0;

!

1
s) ]wM(18)
!
0

(19)

Unlike in the baseline version, the average income in the informal sector depends
on the size of the modern sector as well as on the wage rate and the wage share
in this sector. The relative wage is determined by the size of modern sector and
the wage share in this sector.

3.3

Relative-wage norms

The endogeneity of the relative wage leaves the modi…ed Goodwin system (9)(10) unchanged: the share of pro…ts in the modern sector (and capitalists’saving
rate) still determine the modern-sector accumulation rate, and the endogeneity
of relative wages is of no signi…cance for the dynamics in the absence of feedback
e¤ects from relative wages to the distribution of income in the modern sector.
The exclusion of feedback e¤ects is implausible, however: there is substantial
evidence that wage relativities exert a powerful in‡uence on wage formation.9
Keynes (1936) emphasized workers’ resistance to cuts in relative wages as
a source of nominal wage rigidity, while Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) highlighted the importance of reciprocity and norms of fairness. Workers
who feel they have been treated badly will tend to reciprocate; morale and labor
productivity will su¤er, giving …rms an incentive to pay ‘fair wages’.
Fairness-based accounts of wage setting are singled out by Bewley (1999)
as the only ones out of a large set of candidates that are consistent with the
empirical evidence on wage stickiness in recessions. These accounts, it should
be noted, can apply to labor markets without collective bargaining and labor
unions (as in Akerlof and Yellen 1990) as well as to unionized labor markets;
violations of prevailing pay norms induce aggressive wage demands and steel the
rank and …le to …ght for these demands in a unionized economy. The precise
forms may be di¤erent in unionized and non-unionized settings, but the basic
mechanism is the same: the perception of fairness is important in wage setting,
and fairness is judged in large part with reference to relative wages.
9 Depending on parameters, the average income in the informal sector given by equation
(19) could even exceed the wage in the formal sector. The economy becomes mature, however,
and the modern sector faces labor constraints when the wage premium has be been eliminated.
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The presence of relative-wage norms suggests a respeci…cation of the equation for the dynamics of wages in the modern sector. Formally, assume that the
F
fair wage wM
is given by
F
wM
= wU
and that wage demands respond to deviations of the current wage ratio from
the fair ratio,
wM
wM
wF
)= (
)
!
^M = ( M
wU
wU
wU
Using equation (19) and assuming, for simplicity, that a = 0, the dynamics of
the wage share can now be written as
1
)
( ; !)

!
^= (

(20)

The accumulation rate and the dynamics of employment in the modern sector is
unchanged, and equation (9) still holds. Equation (20) replaces (10), however.
The system (9) and (20) still has a unique (non-trivial stationary solution
and the determinant remains positive. The trace, however, has turned negative,
and the stationary solution is locally stable if ! < 0 (which happens if s < 1).
The economic intuition is straightforward. The change in the wage share is
increasing in the relative wage wU =wM ; and an increase in wM raises incomes
in the informal sector less than proportionately if capitalists spend some of their
pro…ts on the consumption of informal goods Thus, the level of the wage share
has a stabilizing, negative feedback e¤ect on change in the wage share:

3.4

Endogenous norms

Wage aspirations and norms of fairness are predetermined in the short run but
clearly di¤er across space and change over time. The real wage aspirations of
auto workers in Germany, the Czech Republic and India are quite di¤erent,
while wages that were considered fair by VW workers in 1960 would be deemed
unacceptable in 2020. In short, wage aspirations are path dependent. Or as
Marx put it, the value of labor power has a "historical and moral element".10
The historical and moral element also applies to relative wages. As noted by
Hicks (1975), it can be di¢ cult to achieve a general consensus on what is fair
and what is not. No system of wages, Hicks argues,
1 0 The

full quote is:

In contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into
the determination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral element.
Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the
means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known. (Marx
1867 [1906], p. 190)
Marx’s analysis focused on the real wage and the con‡ict between capitalists and workers.
Equation (20) could be extended to include an e¤ect of pro…t shares on target real wages.
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when it is called into question, will ever be found to be fair. ... [To
avoid the system being called into question, PS] the system of wages
should be well established, so that it has the sanction of custom. It
then becomes what is expected; and (admittedly on a low level of
fairness) what is expected is fair (p. 65).
The gradual adjustment of notions of fairness …nds support in social psychology
and behavioral economics:
Psychological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable state of
a¤airs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense
that alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind. ... Thus,
the gap between the behaviour that people consider fair and the
behavior that they expect in the market-place tends to be rather
small. (Kahneman et al. 1986, pp. 730-1)
As a simple formal representation of these behavioral observations, suppose
that the fair wage ratio changes over time in response to di¤erences between
actual and fair relative wages; that is,
changes in response to di¤erences
between wM =wU and :11
_ = (

wM
wU

)= (

1
( ; !)

)

(21)

where is the adjustment speed for the target relative wage. The speci…cation
in equation (21) is quite mechanical and leaves out many factors that may in‡uence workers’ aspirations and their willingness and ability to …ght for wage
increases. Institutional factors and labor market legislation can be critical, and
workers’militancy, more generally, cannot be separated from broader political
and social movements. Aggressive wage demands and high and rising strike
activity in the US, western Europe and many other countries in the late 1960s,
for instance, did not develop independently of a general radicalization involving civil rights movements, anti-Vietnam war movements, student protests and
rising opposition against dictatorships and oppression in many countries. With
these caveats, however, equation (21) captures a systematic and potentially important mechanism in the formation of wage aspirations.
The three-dimensional system (9), (20) and (21) has a continuum of stationary points. The dynamic equation for de…nes a unique stationary solution for
! (! = ! ), but the stationarity of ! and are ensured for for any combination
of and that satis…es ( ; ! ) = 1= . The dynamic implications of the system
!
^ and therefore, by integration,
becomes clearer by noting that _ =
=

log ! + c

(22)

where c; the arbitrary constant of integration, is determined by initial conditions
(the initial values of ! and ). Substituting (22) into (20), the dynamics of !
1 1 Similar

speci…cations have been used by Skott (2005) and Martins and Skott (2021).
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can be written as
!
^= (

log ! + c

1
)
( ; !)

(23)

The two-dimensional system de…ned by (9) and (23) has a unique (non-trivial)
and locally stable stationary solution (the Jacobian has a positive determinant
and a negative trace). The stationary solution for ! is ! = 1 n+
s , while the
stationary solution for the employment share of the modern sector is increasing
in ! and decreasing in c;
= (!; c) with ! > 0; c < 0:12
The dependence of the share of employment in the modern sector, , on
the constant of integration captures the path dependency of long-run underemployment. In the standard Goodwin model a shock to the wage share leaves the
stationary solution and the average value of the employment share of the modern
sector unchanged.13 In the version with endogenous norms, by contrast, positive
shocks to ! and/or raise the constant c, generating a permanent increase in
the degree of underemployment. There is no natural rate of underemployment.
The sensitivity of long-term outcomes to initial conditions is ampli…ed by
another empirically plausible modi…cation of the wage equation. Workers react to deviations of the fair wage ratio from the actual ratio, but the fair ratio
may be a little fuzzy. Workers, moreover, lack accurate information about average incomes in the informal sector; their perceptions of current relative wages
derive from interactions with friends and family, observations of the spending
behavior of neighbors and acquaintances, and news stories. Large and sudden
shifts in relative wages will provoke a reaction, but slow and gradual changes
may not be noticed. Much like a frog that fails to notice and react to the increasing temperature of water that is heated slowly, modern-sector workers may
get accustomed to a decline in their relative wage without fully realizing the
deterioration of their relative position.14
This argument is analogous to Rowthorn’s (1977) suggestion that wage setters will ignore expected in‡ation as long as it stays below a threshold level but
adjust their nominal wage demands fully to expected in‡ation rates above the
threshold. Rowthorn’s analysis focused on real wages and the extent to which
price in‡ation a¤ects the growth rate of nominal wages, but the same basic
point also applies in the present setting: workers may not react to a slow erosion of the relative wage. Using a threshold formulation, this argument implies
a respeci…cation of the wage dynamics:
!
^=

0
(

1
m<
( ;!) < m
elsewhere

if
1
( ;!) )

(24)

the implicit function theorem and the fact that
satis…es
! + c = ( 1;!) :
is a caveat to this statement. Non-linearities in the equations can make the average
values of the variables di¤er from the stationary solution and cause the average values to
depend on the amplitude of the ‡uctuations. Because of this dependence, shocks can have
(minor) e¤ects on average values.
1 4 This frog metaphor does not capture the behavior of real frogs, according to modern
biology. Frogs that do not change location in response to overheating would not survive in
the wild. No similar physiological and evolutionary mechanisms are at play when it comes to
social norms of fairness.
1 2 Use

1 3 There
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where m is the threshold beyond which deviations from the norm become apparent and lead to demands for an increased product real wage.
The full dynamics of the three dimensional model with threshold e¤ects are
complicated. To illustrate the ampli…cation of the e¤ects of initial positions,
however, suppose that initially the actual relative wage conforms to the norm
( ( 1;!) = ) and let ! denote the wage share associated with a stationary
share of employment in the modern sector (! = 1 sn ). If the initial value
of the wage share falls below ! , the modern sector is growing (^ > 0) and the
relative wage of modern-sector workers declines as the sector expands ( ( 1;!)
is decreasing in ). The emerging di¤erence between the actual and the fair
relative wage generates downward movements in ; formally, _ = ( ( 1;!)
)
turns negative. The wage share, however, does not react as long as the di¤erence
remains below the threshold, and the accumulation rate in the modern sector
remains above the natural rate (^ > 0).
The e¤ect of increases in on actual relative wages is highly non-linear –a
small increase in has a larger e¤ect on the relative wage for high levels of –
and the threshold will be reached at some point as grows. But the decline in
the relative-wage norm may proceed for a long time before that happens; the
rise in ! is delayed, allowing the modern sector to expand further than in the
case without a threshold for adjustment in !: Conversely, if the initial value of
the wage share is above ! , the employment share of the modern sector will be
falling. The decline in the wage share ! and the resulting increase in ^ are now
delayed by the non-linearity of the wage equation (24). Thus, the decline of the
modern sector – the deindustrialization – can proceed further than in the case
without the threshold.

4

Conclusions

The average medium and long run growth rate matches the natural rate in
mature economies. Like Kaldor’s neo-Keynesian model, the Marx-Goodwin
tradition explains this outcome by endogenizing the distribution of income and
assuming that the accumulation rate of capital is increasing as a function of
the pro…t share. The application of traditional labor-market based Goodwin
cycles to developing economies may be hard to justify, however. A baseline
dual-economy version of the model preserves the qualitative properties of the
model but makes questionable assumptions. Small modern sectors and high
rates of underemployment imply that small-scale cyclical ‡uctuations will have
only minor e¤ects on the degree of underemployment, making it unlikely that the
‡uctuations should exert a signi…cant e¤ect on the balance of power in the labor
market. Perhaps even more important, economic development involves trend
increases in the modern sector: the medium and long run pace of economic
growth is not constrained by the natural rate, as suggested by the baseline
adaptation of the Goodwin model to a dual economy.
The modi…ed Goodwin models in this paper represent an attempt to over-
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come these weaknesses of the baseline version. Relative-wage norms are central
to wage setting in the modi…ed models, and norms change endogenously. This
endogeneity leads to path dependence (hysteresis) in the stationary solution
for the employment share of the modern sector. The e¤ects of shocks – the
sensitivity of the long-run outcome to initial conditions – may be ampli…ed by
non-linearities in the adjustment of wages to deviations of actual wages from
the norm, as a exempli…ed by simple threshold formulations.
The presence of hysteresis with respect to the employment share of the modern sector in the dual economy model parallels the analysis of mature economies
in Skott (2005): path dependency of wage norms creates employment hysteresis and undermines the notion of a natural rate of unemployment. But unlike
in mature economies where the range of stationary solutions for the employment rate is relatively narrow, the employment share of the modern sector can
stagnate at a very low level in a dual economy.
By de…nition a mature economy is close to something like full employment
in the sense that labor supply constraints would make Chinese-style annual
growth rates of 8-10 percent unsustainable for more than a couple of years.
To maintain maturity, the average medium and long run growth rates of a
mature economy must be approximately equal to the natural rate; they cannot
exceed the natural rate without leading to labor constraints, and if growth falls
systematically below the natural rate for a prolonged period, the economy ceases
to be mature. The latter possibility cannot be excluded, and arguably there are
cases where this has happened.15 These issues are beyond the scope of this
paper, however.
Disregarding transitions from mature to dual, a mature economy described
by the Goodwin model exhibits ‡uctuations of the employment rate around a
stationary solution that falls within a narrow range. Matters are quite di¤erent
for a dual economy whose medium and long run growth rate need not be tethered
to the natural rate. A successful development process involves secular increases
in the share of the modern sector, increases that are made possible by the
endogeneity of the relative wage target. The cycles predicted by the baseline
dual-economy version of the Goodwin model cannot account for this possibility:
the model gives a misleading picture of the constraints on and the dynamics of
the development process.
The Marx-Goodwin tradition assumes that capital is fully utilized and that
a decrease in the wage share raises the accumulation rate. Even in this context,
the growth of the modern sector and the pace of economic development can be
stimulated in ways that do not suppress the product real wage in the modern
sector. As an obvious alternative, reductions in luxury consumption –increases
in the saving rate s –have e¤ects on accumulation that are similar to those of a
fall in the wage share. Increasing labor productivity also boosts accumulation for
1 5 Skott (1989, section 6.4.3) noted that the stabilizing forces in a model with Harrodian
local instability may be too weak to prevent cumulative downward divergence. Empirically,
Taylor and Omer (2017), Storm (2017) and Mendieta Munoz et al. (2021) make a case that
increasing wage inequality and the coexistence of high and low productivity sectors have given
the US economy some characteristics of a dual economy.
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any given wage, and productivity gains can be achieved by temporary subsidies
to boost accumulation if the modern sector exhibits dynamic increasing returns.
Full capacity utilization (a constant degree of utilization), second, is a useful
approximation for long-run analysis, but demand-induced ‡uctuations of the
utilization rate are central to short-run ‡uctuations. The exclusion of aggregate
demand issues –the potential for realization crisis, using Marxian terminology
–represents a serious limitation of the analysis. Like their mature counterparts,
developing economies may be subject to Harrodian instability, with another important source of instability coming from the external sector and the domestic
policy response to external shocks (Martins and Skott 2021). These issues are
beyond the scope of this paper, which has had a more limited purpose: to examine Goodwinian speci…cations of wage setting and their application to mature
and dual economies.

Appendix A: A generalized Goodwin model
Consider the generalized Goodwin system
x_ =
y_ =

0
1

1 (y) 1 (x);
2 (x) 2 (y);

2

0

> 0;
< 0;

>0
2 >0

1

where 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 are continuously di¤erentiable and where we assume that
the system has a stationary solution x ; y It is readily seen that this generalized
system includes the simple Goodwin system as a special case: let 1 and 2 be
a¢ ne and specify 1 (x) = x; 2 (y) = y .
A transformation of the generalized system brings it on the form
p_
q_

= f (q); f 0 > 0
= g(p); g 0 < 0

(25)
(26)

To see this, de…ne p and q as
p
q

=
=

1 (x)
2 (y)

=
=

Z

x

Z ky
m

1
d
1( )
1
du
2( )

where m and k are arbitrarily chosen constants. Since 1 and 2 are both
positive, the functions 1 and 2 are monotonically increasing. Furthermore,
p_

=

q_

=

1
x_ =
1 (x)
1
y_ =
2 (y)

1 (y)

=

1( 2

1

(q)) = f (q)

2 (x)

=

2( 1

1

(p)) = g(p)

In order to show that the system (25)-(26) generates conservative ‡uctuations we multiply the left-hand side of ((25) by the right-hand side of (26) and
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the right-hand side of ((25) with the left-hand side of (26) to get
g(p)p_ = f (q)q_
or
g(p)p_

f (q)q_ = 0

(27)

The variables p and q (and their derivatives) are functions of t; integrating (27)
we get
Z
Z
Z
Z
g(p)pdt
_
f (q)qdt
_ = g(p)dp
f (q)dq = C
(28)
where C is an arbitrary constant. Now de…ne
Z
H(p(t); q(t)) = F (q) G(p) = f (q)dq

Z

g(p)dp

(29)

From (27) and (28) it follows that the function H is constant, H(p; q) = C; the
value of the constant being determined by the initial conditions (that is, by the
initial values of p and q). Furthermore,
Hp =

G0 (p) =

g(p); Hq = F 0 (q) = f (q)

(30)

and
Hpp =

g 0 > 0; Hqq = f 0 > 0; Hqp = Hpq = 0

(31)

It follows that
the function H is convex
H has a global minimum at the stationary equilibrium, (p ; q ) = ( 1 (x );
This follows since Hp = Hq = 0 holds at the equilibrium.

2 (y

starting in some initial point away from the equilibrium, (p; q) will be
circling around the level curve corresponding to the constant C (which in
turn is determined by the initial values p0 ; q0 ):
Conservative ‡uctuations of (p; q) around (p ; q ) imply conservative ‡uctuations of (x; y) around (x ; y ) Furthermore, suitable speci…cations of the
functions i and i ensure that the equilibrium values x and y belong to the
unit interval and that if the initial values x0 and y0 are in the unit interval, then
all trajectories for (x; y) will remain inside the unit box. As an example, choose
x) and 2 (y) = y(1 y):
1 (x) = x(1

Appendix B: Induced technical change in the Goodwin model
The benchmark Goodwin model assumes a constant rate of labor saving technical change. Suppose that, instead, the rate of technical change, a, is determined
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)):

by the growth rate of the modern sector, the share wages in income and the
employment share of the modern sector. Formally,
^ ; !; );
a = a(M

1 > aM^ > 0; a!

0; a

0

This formulation includes the Verdoorn e¤ect (1 > aM^ > 0) well as the possibility that the pace of labor saving technical change may depend on share of
wages (a! 0) and the tightness of the labor market (a
0). The endogeneity
of technical change a¤ects the qualitative dynamics; the Goodwin system now
becomes
^ = s (1
!
^

=

!) (n0 + a(^; !; ))
( + a(^; !; )) +

or
^ =
!
^ =

( ; !);
( ; !);

0;
R 0;

<0
! R0

!

The local stability properties are ambiguous. Local instability, for instance,
arises in the simple Verdoorn case in which labor productivity growth depends
only on the accumulation rate (a! = a = 0; a^ > 0) This Verdoorn speci…cation
implies that both partials of are positive,
> 0 and ! > 0, while ! = 0:
Thus, both the trace and determinant of the Jacobian become unambiguously
positive. Without the Verdoorn e¤ect – a^ = 0 – and with a weak e¤ect of !
on productivity growth, by contrast, the stationary point is locally stable: the
determinant will be positive and the trace negative.
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